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Abstract
This paper is a contribution to the formalisation of Thagard’s coherence theory. The term coherence is defined as
the quality or the state of cohering, especially a logical, orderly, and aesthetically consistent relationship of parts.
A coherent set is interdependent such that every element in it contributes to the coherence. We take Thagard’s
proposal of a coherence set as that of maximising satisfaction of constraints between elements and explore its use
in normative multiagent systems. In particular, we interpret coherence maximisation as a decision-making criterion
for norm adoption. We first provide a general coherence framework with the necessary computing tools. Later we
introduce a proof-theoretic characterisation of a particular type of coherence, namely the deductive coherence based
on Thagard’s principles, and derive a mechanism to compute coherence values between elements in a deductive
coherence graph. Our use of graded logic helps us to incorporate reasoning under uncertainty, which is more realistic
in the context of multiagent systems. We then conduct a case study where agents deliberate about norm adoption
in a multiagent system where there is competition for a common resource. We show how a coherence-maximising
agent decides to violate a norm guided by its coherence.
Keywords: deductive coherence, multiagent systems, normative systems
1 Introduction
A normative multiagent system is a multiagent system where the agent interactions are
governed by norms. In the context of this paper, norms are associated with regulatory
norms such as obligations, permissions and prohibitions, which specify the ideal behaviour
of agents. While a normative multiagent system is prescriptive about agent behaviour, it
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2 Deductive coherence and norm adoption
does so within the framework of autonomous agents. That is, the system assumes agents
to reason about norms autonomously. This is because the success of such systems does not
depend on all the agents following the prescribed norms blindly, rather on having rational
agents deliberate about the prescribed norms, evaluate their usefulness, selectively follow
those norms that improve their efficiency, and effect a change when there are conflicts,
inefficiencies, or situational changes that they can perceive. We understand such agents as
norm-autonomous and refer to the term ‘autonomy’ in this respect.
We are certainly not the first to identify this need, and there have been numerous attempts
in the recent past explicitly addressing this issue [7, 14, 23, 25, 27, 36]. Many of these efforts
are focused towards extending the cognitive agent theory (for instance the Belief, Desire,
and Intention theory [29]) with explicit representations of norms (BOID [9], EMIL [14], and
NoA [23]). However, apart from providing static-priority based autonomy1 and recognising
autonomous norm acceptance phases, a gap still exists in creating norm-autonomous agents.
To enhance the autonomous capabilities of agents, we propose a normative agent theory
which extends the BDI theory with the theory of coherence [31]. Coherence theory, when used
to explain human reasoning, proposes that humans accept or reject a cognition (external or
internal) depending on how much it contributes to maximising the constraints imposed by
situations and other cognitions. Pasquier et al. [27] introduced the possibility of extending
agent reasoning with Thagard’s theory of coherence. While their contribution introduces the
concept of coherence in the field of multiagent systems, they still do not clarify the nature of
a coherence relation nor specify how a graph representing these relations can be constructed.
Thus, a general computational model of coherence and coherence-based reasoning in norm-
autonomous agents is still required.
According to the theory of coherence, there are coherence and incoherence relations
between pieces of information depending on whether they support (yielding a positive con-
straint) or contradict each other (yielding a negative constraint). If two pieces of information
are not related, then there is no coherence (constraint) between them. Due to the fact that
coherence is evaluated based on constraints that exist between pairs of pieces of information,
a graph representation is most intuitive. Normally a graph with nodes and weighted edges
is used to represent the pieces of information and constraints between them. Given such
a coherence graph, Thagard defines a mechanism to compute the overall coherence of the
graph based on maximising constraint satisfaction between pairs of nodes. Certain principles
are also defined to characterise and differentiate various types of coherence relations that
might exist between pairs. Understanding these principles and deducing methods to com-
pute the coherence values between them is fundamental to compute the overall coherence
of a given coherence graph. Without this important formalisation, practical realisations of
coherence are hard to imagine.
In this paper we have chosen to analyse one such type of coherence, namely deductive
coherence, because the theorems of logical deduction from which it is derived are well under-
stood. However, these results could be applied in analysing other types of coherence. Our
aim is to generate coherence values between pairs of pieces of information (in this case, for-
mulas in a logical language) by formalising the relationship between coherence and logical
1A norm priority agent will always prefer norm compliance over satisfaction of private goals when there is a
conflict.
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entailment. Coherence as a logical relation is significant in itself and has important implica-
tions: it is tolerant to inconsistencies and allows us to work with deductive systems without
certain structural rules such as Weakening.
More specifically, the research objectives aimed at in this paper are two:
1. to find a reasoning mechanism for norm-autonomous agents that enables them to resolve
conflicts among cognitions and norms;
2. to determine if and how such a reasoning tool can be incorporated in an agent theory
such as the BDI theory.
The first objective is, thus, to look for an appropriate theory for norm-autonomous agents.
To address it, we propose the theory of coherence as the reasoning mechanism for design-
ing norm-autonomous agents. Though the theory has been proposed earlier to extend BDI
agents in the context of communication, it has not been proposed as a general theory in
the context of normative systems. The second objective is to define a computational model
for this theory. We address it by proposing a coherence-driven BDI agent architecture that
incorporates a reasoning algorithm.
Thus the main contributions in this paper are:
1. A formalisation of Thagard’s principles of deductive coherence [31].
2. A coherence-driven agent architecture for norm-autonomous agents together with an
algorithm for coherence-driven agent reasoning.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. We first give a general introduction
to Thagard’s theory of coherence, which helps the reader to understand the basic notions
of coherence and how it differs from other related theories. We then introduce a generic
coherence framework that can be used to create coherence-driven agents. We discuss in this
framework how pieces of information can be organised in the form of a graph, along with the
necessary computable functions to evaluate and maximise the coherence of such a graph.
We then specialise the formulation for a particular type of coherence, namely deductive
coherence. We derive a deductive coherence function based on the deduction relation of
a logic, although the function we define is independent of the underlying logic. Next, we
introduce a proof-theoretic characterisation of coherence focusing on deductive coherence.
We discuss the formal properties of coherence and illustrate how these properties help us to
derive coherence values between pieces of information.
Then, we define a coherence-driven agent as a cognitive agent whose decisions or actions
are based on coherence maximisation. For this purpose we define certain specific graphs
corresponding to a cognitive agent. We adapt concepts from multi-context systems so that
our coherence-driven agent can reason with its cognitions and norms put together. We later
sketch a procedure an agent may follow in the context of a normative multiagent system.
Finally we conduct a case study, in which we take a specific normative multiagent system.
This case study is inspired from a real-world scenario where a few southern regions of India
participate in a water sharing normative system to share a common commodity, water,
according to needs and quantity available. We in particular consider two representative
regions, with one releasing water and the other receiving it under the agreements of the
treaty. One of the regions modelled as a coherence-driven agent decides to adopt or violate
the norm (in this case, the signed treaty) driven by its coherence maximisation.
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2 Theory of Coherence
In this section, we introduce the theory of coherence in general and provide a summary of
Thagard’s theory, which is the major inspiration and the base of this work. We then interpret
Thagard’s theory as a decision theory and contrast it with other decision theories.
2.1 General Theory of Coherence
Some of the foundational questions in epistemology deal with the origin, structure, and
nature of knowledge and justified belief. The regress problem is important when studying the
structure of how knowledge is acquired or beliefs are justified. One of the central questions
in the regress problem is to know how one knows or is justified in believing some particular
thing. Many epistemologists studying justification have attempted to argue for various types
of chains of reasoning that can escape the regress problem.
1. The series is infinitely long, with every statement justified by some other statement.
2. The series forms a loop, so that each statement is ultimately involved in its own justi-
fication.
3. The series terminates with certain statements having to be self-justifying.
There are two main schools of thought in answering this question, foundationalism and
coherentism. The foundationalist rejects answers 1 and 2 and argues that 3 is the valid
answer. According to the foundationalist option, the series of beliefs terminates with special
justified beliefs called basic beliefs: these beliefs do not owe their justification to any other
beliefs from which they are inferred [17]. Coherentism, however, argues that the second
argument is the valid one.
Coherentism rejects the argument that the regress proceeds according to a pattern of
linear justification. To avoid the charge of circularity, coherentists hold that an individual
belief is justified circularly by the way it fits together (coheres) with the rest of the belief
system of which it is a part. This theory has the advantage of avoiding the infinite regress
without claiming special, possibly arbitrary status for some particular class of beliefs. There
is nothing within the definition of coherence that makes it impossible for two entirely differ-
ent sets of beliefs to be internally coherent. Thus, there might be several such sets, and pure
coherentism does not offer a solution. However, later theories of coherence admit certain
favorable statements whose presence in a set makes it more coherent than other competing
sets. These special statements are some of the obvious statements (which do not need jus-
tification). This sometimes is described as the meeting point between foundationalism and
coherentism [24].
Even if one rejects the pure theory of coherence, one cannot deny the fact that the prop-
erty of coherence is a necessary if not a sufficient property of a system of justified beliefs
or knowledge. This view on coherence has given raise to many applications of the theory in
the field of philosophy and psychology. Recently, computer scientists have been increasingly
taking a look at coherence and their applications in modelling behaviour of artificial enti-
ties such as agents [27]. Though the theory of coherence has been around for long, it was
only recently when the philosopher scientist Paul Thagard proposed a model of coherence
as maximisation of constraint satisfaction, that the abstract theory of coherence became
conceivable and even computable. Because this paper bases its foundations on this theory,
we introduce it next.
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2.1.1 Thagard’s Formalisation
Paul Thagard is one of the philosophers who have attempted to introduce a computational
interpretation of coherence. Thagard postulates that the theory of coherence is a cognitive
theory with foundations in philosophy that approaches problems in terms of the satisfaction
of multiple constraints within networks of highly interconnected elements [31, 32]. At the
interpretation level, Thagard’s theory of coherence is the study of associations, that is,
how a piece of information influences another and how best different pieces of information
can fit together. Each piece of information imposes constraints on others, the constraints
being positive or negative. Positive constraints strengthen pieces of information, thereby
increasing coherence, while negative constraints weaken them, thereby increasing incoher-
ence. Hence, a coherence problem is to put together those pieces of information that have
a positive constraint between them, while separating those having a negative constraint.
Coherence is maximised if we obtain such a partition of information where a maximum
number of constraints is satisfied. Thus in this sense, reasoning is framed as a classification
problem.
Thagard formalises coherence as follows [31]: The basic notions are that of a set of pieces
of information that are represented as nodes in a graph with weighted links, or constraints,
between these nodes. Further, some of these constraints are positive (representing coherence)
and others negative (representing incoherence), and associated with each constraint is a
number that indicates the weight of the constraint. Given these, maximising coherence is
formulated as the problem of partitioning the set of nodes into two sets, A (the accepted
nodes) and R (the rejected nodes), in a way that it maximises compliance with the following
two coherence conditions:
• if edge {v,w} is positive, then v∈A if and only if w∈A.
• if edge {v,w} is negative, then v∈A if and only if w∈R.
If an edge complies with one of the above conditions, then, Thagard defines it as a satisfied
constraint. The coherence problem is thus simply to maximise the sum of the weights of the
satisfied constraints.
Thagard further proposes six main kinds of coherence: explanatory, deductive, conceptual,
analogical, perceptual, and deliberative, each with its own array of elements and constraints.
Once these elements and constraints are specified, then the algorithms that solve the general
coherence problem can be used to compute coherence in ways that apply to specific domain
problems.
Thagard has also experimented with many computational implementations of coherence.
ECHO is a computational model of explanatory coherence which uses a connectionist algo-
rithm [31]. Though there is no guarantee that such neural network models for coherence
would converge to a coherence-maximising partition, he claims that on small networks it
has been shown to give good results.
Thus, Thagard proposes the first major concrete account of coherence that takes us from
the abstract notion of coherence to a computational phenomenon that can be evaluated.
One of the main drawbacks of his theory is that he stops with giving certain principles
about calculating values of coherence constraints for different types of coherence. However,
to compute these values, one needs to have concrete functions with proven properties. This
paper is mainly an attempt in this direction, while also attempting to propose the theory
as a primary decision making mechanism for agents in normative multiagent systems.
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2.2 Comparison with Other Decision Theories
Keeping Thagard’s approach to coherence as maximising constraint satisfaction, we try to
understand the main concept behind this theory. We associate coherence with an ever-
changing system where coherence is the only property that is preserved, while everything
around it changes. In cognitive terms, this would mean that, there are no beliefs nor other
cognitions that are taken for granted or fixed forever. Everything can be changed and may
be changed to keep coherence. We humans tend to revise or re-evaluate adherence to social
norms, our plans, goals and even beliefs when we are faced with incoherence. However, we do
not suppose that taking decisions based on coherence imply an unstable system. Our claim
is based on the fact that some beliefs are more fundamental than others. Revision of such
fundamental belief is less frequent compared to other beliefs. In coherence terms, these beliefs
are fundamental because they support and get support from most other cognitions and hence
are in positive coherence with them. Hence, such beliefs will almost always be part of the
chosen set while maximising coherence. The same is the case with other cognitions while
the process of coherence maximisation further helps resolve conflicts by selecting among the
best alternatives.
When applied to decision making, this means that we may not only select the set of
actions to be performed to achieve certain fixed goals, but also look for the best set of
goals to be pursued. Further, since coherence affects everything from beliefs to goals and
actions, it may happen that beliefs contradicting a decision made are discarded. There are
psychological theories such as cognitive dissonance [18] that explain this phenomenon as an
attempt to justify the action chosen. Thus, with coherence we are looking at a more dynamic
model of cognitions where one picks and chooses goals, actions and even beliefs to fit a grand
plan of maximising coherence. In concrete terms, a highly desired state of the world (desired
in a classical sense) may get discarded in front of a less desired state of the world because
it is incoherent with the rest of the beliefs, desires or intentions.
As discussed in [31], this view of decision making is very different from those of classical
decision-making theories where the notion of preference is atomic and there is no conceptual
understanding of how preferences can be formed. In contrast, coherence-based decision mak-
ing tries to understand and evaluate these preferences from the available complex network
of constraints. The assumption here is more basic because the only knowledge available to
us are the various interacting constraints between pieces of information.
3 Coherence Framework
In this section we introduce the generic coherence framework together with those com-
putable functions that will allow us to build coherence-driven agents (see Section 5). Our
framework is based on Thagard’s formulation of the theory of coherence as maximising
constraint satisfaction. The theory of coherence is based on the underlying assumption that
pieces of information can be associated with each other, the association being either positive
or negative. Since we are interested in studying these associations, we use graphs with nodes
and edges to model these associations. Here we differ from other approaches in extending
agent theories [9, 27] as we modify the way an agent framework is perceived by making the
associations in the cognitions explicit in representation and analysis. That is, we introduce
coherence as a fundamental property of the cognitions of an agent. In the following defi-
nitions, we introduce what we call coherence graphs, the various computable functions to
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determine the coherence of such graphs, and how the coherence of a given graph can be
maximised.
3.1 Coherence Graphs
The nodes in a coherence graph represent the pieces of information for which we want to
estimate coherence. Examples of such pieces of information are propositions representing
concepts, actions or mental states both atomic and complex, graded and absolute. Edges
between nodes may be associated with a strength, represented by a function ζ, which is
derived from the underlying relation between the pieces of information. That is, if two
pieces of information are related through an explanation, for instance, then the function
ζ assigns a positive strength to the edge connecting those pieces of information. Based on
Thagard’s classification of the types of coherence, we have different ζ functions. The value
of the function ζ, that is, the strength on an edge, may be negative or positive. Note that
a zero strength on an edge implies that the two pieces of information are unrelated, which
is equivalent to not having the edge connecting the pieces of information. Hence, we only
consider nonzero strength values on edges. Thagard’s principles may be used to define a
function ζ for each different type of coherence (see Section 4).
We consider a running example as in Figure 1, which will help us to illustrate the concepts
as we define them. The graph in the example captures deductive coherence as yielded by
classical propositional deduction. As we gradually build our framework, we shall see how
these coherence values arise.
DEFINITION 3.1
A coherence graph is an edge-weighted undirected graph g=〈V ,E,ζ〉, where
1. V is a finite set of nodes representing pieces of information.
2. E⊆V (2) (where V (2)={{v,w} |v,w∈V }) is a finite set of edges representing the coher-
ence or incoherence between pieces of information.
3. ζ :E→[−1,1]\{0} is an edge-weighted function that assigns a value to the coherence
between pieces of information, and which we shall call a coherence function
Let G denote the set of all possible coherence graphs.
0.5
0.5 –1
–0.5
0.5
–0.5
FIG. 1. An example of a coherence graph
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3.2 Calculating Coherence
According to coherence theory, if a piece of information is chosen as accepted (or declared
true), pieces of information contradicting it are most likely rejected (or declared false) while
those supporting it and getting support from it are most likely accepted (or declared true).
The important problem is not to find a piece of information that gets accepted, but to know
whether more than one piece of information or a set of them can be accepted together.
Hence, the coherence problem is to partition the nodes of a coherence graph into two sets
(accepted A, and rejected V \A) in such a way as to maximise the satisfaction of constraints.
A positive constraint between two nodes is said to be satisfied if both nodes are either in
the accepted set or both in the rejected set. Similarly, a negative constraint is satisfied if
one of them is in the accepted set while the other is in the rejected set. We express these
formally in the following definitions.
DEFINITION 3.2
Given a coherence graph g=〈V ,E,ζ〉, and a partition (A,V \A) of V , the set of satisfied
constraints CA⊆E is given by
CA=
{
{v,w}∈E
∣∣∣∣ v∈A iff w∈A, when ζ({v,w})>0v∈A iff w ∈A, when ζ({v,w})<0
}
All other constraints (in E \CA) are said to be unsatisfied.
To illustrate this, consider the partition as in Figure 2. We see that {p→q,¬q}, {p→q,p}
and {p,¬q} are the satisfied constraints. Now we define the coherence-maximising partition
as the partition that maximises the satisfaction of constraints. We first define the strength
of a partition as the sum over the strengths (the ζ values) of all the satisfied constraints
divided by the the number of edges in the graph. Then the coherence-maximising partition
is that which maximises the strength, and the coherence value of the graph is defined as the
strength of this partition.
0.5
0.5 –1
–0.5
0.5
–0.5
FIG. 2. A partition of a coherence graph
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DEFINITION 3.3
Given a coherence graph g=〈V ,E,ζ〉, the strength of a partition (A,V \A) of V is given by
σ(g,A)=
∑
{v,w}∈CA
|ζ({v,w}) |
|E |
For the partition in Figure 2, the strength is 0.25. Notice that, by Definitions 3.2 and 3.3,
σ(g,A)=σ(g,V \A) . (1)
DEFINITION 3.4
Given a coherence graph g=〈V ,E,ζ〉, the coherence of g is given by
κ(g)=max
A⊆V
σ(g,A)
If for some partition (A,V \A) of V , the strength of the partition is maximal (i.e., κ(g)=
σ(g,A) then the set A is called the accepted set and V \A the rejected set of the
partition.
Due to Equation 3.1, the accepted set A is never unique for a coherence graph. Moreover,
there could be other partitions that generate the same value for κ(g). Here we mention
some possible criteria for selecting an accepted set among the alternatives. If A1,A2,...,An
are sets from all those partitions that maximise coherence of the graph g, first we may
choose the accepted set to which the intuitively obvious propositions belong. This is based
on one of Thagard’s principles (which we will formalise in the next definition) on deductive
coherence [31], namely that intuitively obvious propositions have an acceptability on their
own. Further, the coherences of the sub-graphs g|Ai , i∈[1,n] can give us an indication of how
strongly connected they are. The higher the coherence, the more preferred the corresponding
accepted set may be. And lastly, an accepted set with more number of elements could be
preferred to another with less.
The coherence maximising partition for our example is as in Figure 3. With this partition
we see that all constraints are satisfied, and this partition gives the maximum strength for
the graph, namely 0.583¯.
0.5
0.5 –1
–0.5
0.5
–0.5
FIG. 3. Coherence-maximising partition of a coherence graph
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4 Formalising Coherence: A Proof-Theoretical Approach
So far we have introduced the general computable functions of our coherence framework
under the assumption that a coherence graph already exists. For this framework to be fully
computational, it is necessary to define how a coherence graph can be constructed. That
is, given a set of pieces of information (and possibly some associated confidence degrees),
we need to define a coherence function ζ that assigns a coherence value to pairs of pieces
of information. As the nature of relationship between two pieces of information can vary
greatly, we may need to define more than one coherence function. But for each type of
coherence, only one such relationship is evaluated. That is, for explanatory coherence, two
pieces of information are coherent only if they are related by an explanation.
Here we study one such type of coherence, namely deductive coherence, and define a
deductive coherence function ζ which captures the deductive relationship between proposi-
tions. We choose deductive coherence among the different types of coherence because logical
deduction has a sound theoretical basis and has well defined rules in order to start with a
formalisation of coherence. We first derive a deductive coherence function in adherence with
Thagard’s principles and later analyse this function in the context of structural and internal
connectives. The latter helps us to further derive coherence values between those pieces of
information that are not directly related by deduction.
We base our coherence function on multiset deduction relations. The concept of a multiset
is a generalisation of the concept of a set. Intuitively speaking, we can regard a multiset as
a set in which the number of times each element occurs is significant, but not the order
of the elements. The introduction of multisets in our framework will allow us to deal more
adequately with logics such as linear logics, relevance logics or multi-valued logics. We shall
abbreviate ‘‘multiset deduction relation’’ with MDR. We assume that all MDRs we deal with
are finitary and decidable. These MDRs are often called simple consequence relations [5].
We define an MDR as follows:
DEFINITION 4.1
Given a logical language L, a multiset deduction relation (MDR) on L, is a binary relation
 between finite multisets of formulas of L such that, for all ,1,2,1,2⊆L and for all
γ ∈L:
Reflexivity: 
Transitivity: If 11,γ and γ,22, then 1,21,2
We denote by β the fact that β can be deduced from the empty multiset, and we denote
by  the fact that the multiset  has as consequence the empty multiset. For example, in
case that L is classical propositional logic, β means that β is a tautology and  means
that the multiset  is inconsistent.
4.1 Coherence Functions
Thagard introduces in [31] the notion of deductive coherence by means of a set of principles:
1. Deductive coherence is a symmetric relation.
2. A proposition coheres with propositions that are deducible from it.
3. Propositions that together are used to deduce some other proposition cohere with each
other.
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4. The more hypotheses it takes to deduce something, the less the degree of coherence.
5. Contradictory propositions are incoherent with each other.
6. Propositions that are intuitively obvious have a degree of acceptability on their own.
7. The acceptability of a proposition in a system of propositions depends on its coherence
with them.
Before going into the details of Thagard’s principles, it is important to note that these
principles were proposed taking into account a context or —in logical terminology— a the-
ory T . Examples of such theories may be the theory of arithmetic while proving theorems
in mathematics, or legal laws while making legal judgements. In the context of autonomous
normative agents, the set of rules and observations about a context is this theory. To be
rigorous we should call T a finite theory presentation. However, to avoid lengthy phrases, we
will often call it just a theory. Assuming bounded rationality for our agents, T is not closed
under deduction. We essentially see the process of coherence maximisation as a process of
theory revision. That is, each time the agent encounters a new piece of information β (a new
norm, a new belief, etc.), it tries to relate it to the theory presentation it has. The new
information can influence T in the following ways:
1. Extend T : β helps to deduce propositions that were not deducible before.
2. Extend T : β is deducible from T .
3. Modify T : β is in a deduction relation with some propositions in T , however, contradicts
some other.
The coherence function we propose here is in the context of a theory T and is moti-
vated to aid this process of theory revision. We use Thagard’s principles to relate an MDR
with a coherence function ζ. Principles 2 and 3 capture the fact that there are certain
positive coherence relations between premises, and between each of the premises and the
conclusion. Since we want to focus only on those deductions that fall in the context of
the theory, we shall define the coherence only between those formulas that are either in
the theory or are subformulas thereof (hence Definition 4.2 below). Principle 4 gives an
indication of the magnitude of coherence. It states that it decreases with the increasing
number of premises required. Principle 5 discusses the case of contradiction. And finally,
Principle 7 stresses the basic notion of coherence, namely that if anything is accepted,
it is because accepting it improves the coherence of the system. Therefore, the theory T
is also part of our coherence graph, and its acceptance is only with respect to coherence
maximisation.
We first formalise Thagard’s principles for classical propositional logic. Principles 2–7 are
formalised in terms of a support function η with respect to a finite theory presentation T ,
and then we use this function to define the coherence function ζ in a way that captures the
symmetry of coherence (Principle 1). Later, in Section 5, we generalise these functions for a
many-valued logic, reinterpreting Thagard’s principles appropriately.
DEFINITION 4.2
Let L be a logical language and let T ⊆L be a finite theory presentation. We call T • the
closure of T under subformulas when α′ ∈T • if and only if there is an α∈T such that α′ is
a subformula of α.
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DEFINITION 4.3
Let L be a logical language and  be an MDR for L. Let T ⊆L be a finite theory presentation.
A support function ηT :T •×T • →[−1,1]\{0} with respect to T is given by:
ηT (α,β)=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
max
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1
||+1 where  is the smallest subset of T • such that
,αβ and  β and α 
1
||+2 where  is the smallest subset of T • such that
∃γ ∈T • such that ,α,βγ and
,α γ and ,β γ and γ 
−1
||+1 where  is the smallest subset of T • such that
,α,β and ,α  and ,β 
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
undefined, otherwise
Since deductive coherence is symmetric, we now set the value of the deductive coherence
between two propositions to be the greatest value of the support function for these propo-
sitions. Due to this, even if there may only be a deduction relation in one direction, there
will be deductive coherence in both directions. Note that both the support function and
the deductive coherence function are partial functions. This is because we interpret zero
coherence as the propositions not being related.
DEFINITION 4.4
Let L be a logical language and  be an MDR for L. Let T ⊆L be a finite theory presentation.
Let ηT :T •×T • →[−1,1]\{0} be a support function with respect to T . A deductive coherence
function ζT :(T •)(2)→[−1,1]\{0} with respect to T is given by:
ζT ({α,β})=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
max{ηT (α,β),ηT (β,α)} if ηT (α,β) and ηT (β,α) are defined
ηT (α,β) if ηT (α,β) is defined
and ηT (β,α) is undefined
undefined if ηT (α,β) and ηT (β,α) are undefined
Our example of Figure 1 assumes that T ={p→q,¬q}, and consequently T • ={p→q,¬q,
p,q}. The only relevant deductions using formulas of T • (and assuming classical propositional
deduction) are:
p→q,p  q
q,¬q 
p→q,p,¬q 
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Therefore, we have that
ηT (p,q) = 1|{p→q}|+1=0.5
ηT (p→q,q) = 1|{p}|+1=0.5
ηT (p→q,p)=ηT (p,p→q) = 1|∅|+2=0.5
ηT (q,¬q)=ηT (¬q,q) = −1|∅|+1=−1
ηT (p,¬q)=ηT (¬q,p) = −1|{p→q}|+1=−0.5
ηT (p→q,¬q)=ηT (¬q,p→q) = −1|{p}|+1=−0.5
and consequently,
ζT ({p,q}) = 0.5
ζT ({p→q,q}) = 0.5
ζT ({p→q,p}) = 0.5
ζT ({q,¬q}) = −1
ζT ({p,¬q}) = −0.5
ζT ({p→q,¬q}) = −0.5
For all remaining pairs of formulas from T •, the value of ζT is undefined.
PROPOSITION 4.5
The deductive coherence function ζT as defined in Definition 4.4 satisfies Thagard’s princi-
ples of deductive coherence (see Section 4.1).
PROOF.
For all ζT , coherence is symmetric by construction, which satisfies Principle 1.
Let ⊆T • and α,β∈T • such that ,αβ and  β and α . Then ηT (α,β)>0, and con-
sequently, ζT ({α,β})>0, which satisfies Principle 2.
Let ⊆T • and α,β,γ ∈T • such that ,α,βγ and ,α γ and ,β γ and γ . Then
ηT (α,β)>0, and consequently, ζT ({α,β})>0, which satisfies Principle 3.
Let 1,2⊆T • with |1|< |2|, and let α1,α2,β∈T • such that 1,α1,β and there does
not exists ′1 such that |′1|< |1| and ′1,α1,β, and 2,α2β and there does not exists ′2
such that |′2|< |2| and ′2,α2,β, and 1 β and 2 β and α1  and α2 . Then ηT (α1,β)>
ηT (α2,β), and consequently, ζT ({α1,β})>ζT ({α2,β}), which satisfies Principle 4.
Let α,β∈T • such that α,β and α  and β . Consequently ηT (α,β)<0, and consequently
ζT ({α,β})<0, which satisfies Principle 5.
Axioms that are intuitively obvious are supposed to be those that belong to the theory T .
Let ⊆T • and α,β∈T • such that ,αβ and  β and α . Then, for all γ ∈, ηT (γ,α)>0.
Hence, axioms in T and its subformulas that participate with other formulas in deduction
relations cohere positively with them, having thus a higher degree of acceptability, which
satisfies Principle 6.
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Finally, Definition 3.4 satisfies Principle 7.
4.2 Properties of Coherence Based on MDRs
To conclude this section, we explore the properties of the deductive coherence function
ζT that would help us determine the values for pairs of formulas related through some of
the structural rules and connectives of the underlying logic. We do this by identifying the
properties of the support function ηT using the properties of the connectives and structural
rules. Our aim is to stress the generality of our approach, although these properties are
not essential for the understanding of the coherence-driven agent architecture introduced in
Section 5.
We can classify logics according to structural rules (such as weakening or monotonicity)
and connectives available in it. There are two types of connectives: the internal connectives,
which transform a given sequent into an equivalent one that has a special required form,
and the combining connectives, which combine two sequents into one. For instance, classical
propositional logic is monotonic, satisfies weakening, has all internal and combining connec-
tives, and makes no difference between them. On the other hand, propositional linear logic is
monotonic, has also all connectives, but distinguishes between internal and combining ones.
Intuitionistic logic differs from classical propositional logic in its implication connective and
does not have internal negation.
By Definition 4.3, the function ηT is defined for formulas of T • ⊆L related through an
MDR in the form ,αβ. Hence we express the deduction relation in this single-conclusioned
form so that we can find properties of function ηT between different formulas of the premises
and conclusion, using the properties of the connectives.2
4.2.1 Combining Conjunction
A conjunction ∧ is combining iff, for all ,⊆L and α,β∈L,
,α∧β iff ,α and ,β
Let T ⊆L and ⊆T • and α∧β,γ ∈T • such that  α and  β and  α∧β and α∧β 
and γ .
1. If ,γα∧β then η(γ,α∧β)>0 and, since ,γα and ,γβ, we have that η(γ,α)≥
η(γ,α∧β) and η(γ,β)≥η(γ,α∧β).
2. If ,γα and ,γβ then η(γ,α)>0 and η(γ,β)>0. Let their values be 1n and 1m ,
respectively. Since ,γα∧β, we further have that η(γ,α∧β)≥ 1n+m−1 .
3. Finally, η(α∧β,α)=1 and η(α∧β,β)=1.
4.2.2 Internal Conjunction
A conjunction ◦ is internal iff, for all ,⊆L and α,β∈L,
,α,β iff ,α◦β
2For convenience, in the rest of this subsection we shall drop the subindex of ηT ; however, it should be noted
that it is always evaluated with respect to a finite theory presentation T .
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Let T ⊆L and ⊆T • and α◦β,σ∈T • such that  σ and ,α σ and ,β σ and α◦β 
and α  and β .
1. If ,α◦βσ then η(α◦β,σ)>0. Let its value be 1n . Since ,α,βσ, we have that η(α,σ)≥
1
n+1 and η(α,σ)≥ 1n+1 .
2. If ,α,βσ then η(α,σ)>0 and η(β,σ)>0. Let their values be 1n and 1m , respectively.
Since ,α◦βσ, we further have that η(α◦β,σ)≥ 1n+m−3 .
3. Finally, η(α,α◦β)≥ 12 and η(β,α◦β)≥ 12 and η(α,β)≥ 12 .
4.2.3 Combining Disjunction
A disjunction ∨ is combining iff, for all ,⊆L and α,β∈L,
,α∨β iff ,α and ,β
Let T ⊆L and ⊆T • and α∨β,σ∈T • such that  σ and α∨β  and α  and β .
1. If ,α∨βσ then η(α∨β,σ)>0 and, since ,ασ and ,βσ, we have that η(α,σ)≥
η(α∨β,σ) and η(β,σ)≥η(α∨β,σ).
2. If ,ασ and ,βσ then η(α,σ)>0 and η(β,σ)>0. Let their values be 1n and 1m ,
respectively. Since ,α∨βσ, we further have that η(α∨β,σ)≥ 1n+m−1 .
3. For all γ ∈T •, we have that η(γ,α∨β)=−1 iff both η(γ,α)=−1 and η(γ,β)=−1.
4. Finally, η(α,α∨β)=1 and η(β,α∨β)=1.
4.2.4 Internal Disjunction
A disjunction + is internal iff, for all ,⊆L and α,β∈L,
,α,β iff ,α+β
Let T ⊆L and ⊆T • and α+β,γ ∈T • such that  α and  α+β and α  and β  and
γ . Further, let  satisfy Weakening.3
1. We distinguish three cases:
• If η(γ,α)>0 because ,γα, and η(γ,β) is undefined, then, since ,γα,β and hence
,γα+β, we have that η(γ,α+β)≥η(γ,α);
• If η(γ,α) is undefined, and η(γ,β)>0 because ,γβ, then, since ,γα,β and hence
,γα+β, we have that η(γ,α+β)≥η(γ,β);
• If both η(γ,α)>0 and η(γ,β)>0 because both ,γα and ,γβ, then, since ,γα,β
and hence ,γα+β, we have that η(γ,α+β)≥max{η(γ,α),η(γ,β)}.
2. Finally, η(α,α+β)=1 and (β,α+β)=1.
4.2.5 Combining Implication
An implication ⊃ is combining iff, for all ,⊆L and α,β∈L,
,α⊃β iff ,α and ,β
3 An MDR  satisfies Weakening if, for all ,′,,′ ⊆L, if  then ,′ ,′.
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Let T ⊆L and ⊆T • and α⊃β,σ∈T • such that  σ and α⊃β  and β .
1. If ,α⊃βσ then η(α⊃β,σ)>0 and, since ,βσ, we have that η(β,σ)≥η(α⊃β,σ).
2. Finally, η(β,α⊃β)=1.
4.2.6 Internal Implication
An implication → is internal iff, for all ,⊆L and α,β∈L,
,α,β iff ,α→β
Let T ⊆L and ⊆T • and α→β,γ ∈T • such that ,γ β and  α→β and α  and γ .
1. If ,γα→β then η(γ,α→β)>0. Let its value be 1n . Since ,γ,αβ, we have that
η(γ,α)≥ 1n and η(γ,β)≥ 1n+1 .
2. If ,γ,αβ then η(γ,β)>0. Let its value be 1n . Since ,γα→β, we have that η(γ,α→
β)≥ 1n−1 .
3. If α→β∈T then η(α,β)≥ 12 .
4. Finally, η(α→β,β)≥ 12 .
4.2.7 Internal Negation
A negation ¬ is internal iff, for all ,⊆L and α∈L,
,α iff ,¬α
Let T ⊆L and ⊆T • and ¬α,γ ∈T • such that ,α  and ,γ .
1. if η(γ,α)<0 then ,γ,α, and consequently ,γ¬α and hence η(γ,¬α)≥−η(γ,α).
2. If ,γ¬α then η(γ,¬α)>0, and since ,γ,α we have that η(γ,α)≤−η(γ,¬α).
3. η(¬α,α)=−1
5 An Architecture for Coherence-Driven Agents
In this section we describe an architecture for coherence-driven agents based on the coher-
ence framework developed so far. A coherence-driven agent is an agent that always takes
an action based on maximisation of coherence of its cognitions, norms, and other social
commitments. We further consider cognitive agents such as those based on BDI theory [29],
since it is one of the prominent existing agent architectures. We use an adaptation of the
architecture developed by Casali et al. [11], which is based on multi-context systems (MCS)
and incorporates reasoning under uncertainty.
In the work of Casali et al., the MCS specification of an agent contains three basic com-
ponents: units or contexts, logics, and bridge rules, which channel the propagation of conse-
quences between theories. Contexts in a multi-context BDI are the contexts of belief, desire,
and intention cognitions. The deduction mechanism of MCS is based on two kinds of infer-
ence rules, internal rule inside each context, and bridge rules between contexts. Internal
rules allow an agent to draw consequences within a context, and they determine an MDR,
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while bridge rules allow to embed results from one context into another [20, 21]. Thus, we
shall define an agent as a tuple 〈{Ci}i=1...n,B〉 consisting of:
- a family {Ci}i=1...n of contexts, n>0, where each context Ci=〈Li,Ai,i,Ti〉 consists of a
language Li , a set of axioms Ai , and an MDR i defining the logical system, together
with a theory presentation Ti⊆Li of the context.
- a set B of bridge rules, i.e., inference rules of the form
i1 :A1 i2 :A2 ··· iq :Aq
j :A
where ik (with k ∈{1,...,q} and q>0) and j are indeces of contexts (i.e., 1≤ ik ,j≤n), and
Ak and A are formula schemata specifying premises from contexts Cik and a conclusion
from context Cj , respectively. (Later we extend the notion of bridge rules to cope with
graded formulas as introduced below.)
In our adaptation of the multi-context architecture, the theories Ti of the contexts will
yield coherence graphs. We have already defined the coherence function ζ derived from
an MDR i within one context (see Definition 4.4). In the following we define how this
coherence function is to be extended to capture how coherence arises between formulas due
to bridge rules carrying consequences from one graph to another. For this we will define
two additional kinds of functions, graph-extension and graph-join functions. First we begin
by giving a brief overview of the contexts in our multi-context system before defining these
functions.
5.1 Cognitive and Norm Contexts
Here we discuss the belief, desire, intention, and norm contexts corresponding to a normative
BDI agent. We take the belief, desire, and intention contexts as defined in Casali et al. [10].
For the norm logic associated with the norm context, we use the work of Godo et al. [15]
on probabilistic deontic logic. We here give a sketch of a belief context, while the details are
in Casali et al. [11]. The desire, intention, and norm contexts can be defined in a similar
fashion, with the belief logic replaced either by a desire, intention, or norm logic, accordingly.
Further, the belief theory TB gives rise to a coherence graph whose nodes are graded formulas
of the belief language.
5.1.1 Belief Logic
Following Casali et al., a belief logic KB=〈LB,AB,B〉 consists of a belief language LB ,
a set of axioms AB and an MDR B . We define the belief language LB by extending a
classical propositional language L defined upon a countable set of propositional variables
and connectives ¬ and →, with a fuzzy unary modal operator B. The modal language LB
is built from elementary modal formulas Bϕ (where ϕ is propositional) and truth constants
r¯ (for each rational r ∈Q∩[0,1]) using the connectives of Lukasiewicz many-valued logic.
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If ϕ is a proposition in L, the intended meaning of Bϕ is that ‘‘ϕ is believable’’. We use a
modal many-valued logic based on Lukasiewicz logic to formalise KB as follows: 4
1. Given a propositional language L, the belief language LB of KB is given by:
• If ϕ∈L then Bϕ∈LB
• If r ∈Q∩[0,1] then r¯ ∈LB
• If ,∈LB then →L∈LB and &∈LB (where & and →L correspond to con-
junction and implication of Lukasiewicz logic)
Other Lukasiewicz logic connectives for the modal formulas can be defined from &, →L
and 0: ¬L is defined as →L 0, ∧ as &(→L), ∨ as ¬L(¬L∧¬L), and
≡ as (→L)&(→L).
2. The axioms AB of KB are:
• all axioms of propositional logic;
• the axioms of Lukasiewicz logic for modal formulas (for instance, axioms of Ha´jek’s
Basic Logic (BL) [22] plus the axiom ¬BL¬BL→BL);
• the probabilistic axioms, i.e., given ϕ,ψ∈L,
B(ϕ→ψ) →L (Bϕ→L Bψ)
Bϕ ≡ ¬LB(ϕ∧¬ψ)→L B(ϕ∧ψ)
¬LBϕ ≡ B¬ϕ
3. Finally, the MDR B of KB is defined by the inference rules of
• modus ponens;
• necessitation for B (i.e., from ϕ derive Bϕ).
Since in Lukasiewicz logic a formula →L is 1-true if, and only if, the truth value
of  is greater or equal to that of , modal formulas of the type r¯→L Bϕ express that
the probability of Bϕ is at least r . We shall use the notation (Bϕ,r) for these kind of
formulas, and call them graded beliefs. Let L∗B⊆LB denote the set of all graded beliefs of LB .
Furthermore, we shall only consider theory presentations TB⊆L∗B expressed using graded
beliefs.
5.1.2 Belief Graph
Our aim is, given a theory presentation TB⊆L∗B expressed using graded beliefs in a belief
language, to define the corresponding coherence graph (see Definition 5.4 further below).
For this, however, we first need to extend the definitions given in Section 4 for graded beliefs
underling a belief language LB . The idea is to determine coherence values between graded
beliefs not only by virtue of the deduction relation; we will also take into account the grades
as specified in the theory presentation TB⊆L∗B .
DEFINITION 5.1
Let LB be the belief language as defined above, and let TB⊆L∗B be a finite theory presentation
using only graded formulas. We call T •B the closure of TB under subformulas when (Bϕ′,r ′)∈
T •B if and only if there is an (Bϕ,r)∈TB such that ϕ′ is a subformula of ϕ and r ′ =sup{q |TB |=
(Bϕ′,q)}.
4We could use other logics as well by replacing the axioms.
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DEFINITION 5.2
Let LB be the belief language and B the MDR as defined above. Let TB⊆L∗B be a finite
theory presentation using only graded formulas. A support function ηTB :T •B ×T •B →[−1,1]
with respect to TB is given by:
ηTB (,)=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
max
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
r
||+1 where  is the smallest subset of T •B such that
,B and  B and  B and =(α,r)
r
||+2 where  is the smallest subset of T •B such that
∃(α,r)∈T •B with α = 0¯ such that
,,B (α,r) and , B (α,r) and
, B (α,r) and
−r
||+1 where  is the smallest subset of T •B such that
,,B (0¯,r) and , B (0¯,r)
and , B (0¯,r)
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
undefined, otherwise
DEFINITION 5.3
Let LB be the belief language as defined above. Let TB⊆L∗B be a finite theory presenta-
tion using only graded formulas. Let ηTB :T •B ×T •B →[−1,1]\{0} be a support function with
respect to TB . A deductive coherence function ζTB :(T •B )(2)→[−1,1]\{0} with respect to TB
is given by:
ζTB ({,})=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
max{ηTB (,),ηTB (,)} if ηTB (,) =0 and ηTB (,) =0
ηTB (,) if ηTB (,) =0
and ηTB (,)=0 or is undefined
undefined if ηTB (,)=0 or is undefined
and ηTB (,)=0 or is undefined
DEFINITION 5.4
Let KB=〈LB,AB,B〉 be a belief logic, where LB is a belief language, AB are a set of axioms
and B is an MDR. Let TB⊆L∗B be a finite theory presentation expressed using graded beliefs
only. A belief graph of TB is the coherence graph g=〈V ,E,ζ〉 where
• V =T •B
• ζ=ζTB
• E={{,}∈V (2) |ζTB ({,}) is defined}
A belief graph represents the graded beliefs of an agent (and all the subformulas thereof)
and the coherences and incoherences among them. A desire graph and intention graph of
theory presentations TD and TI in logics KD, and KI , respectively, would be similarly defined.
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5.1.3 Norm Graph
The normative behaviour in a normative multiagent system is generally described by using
deontic constraints, such as obligations, permissions and prohibitions. Just as we have graded
cognitions for an agent, our norms also come with grades. Grades in general add more rich-
ness to the semantics, and, in particular for the case of norms, the grades help to understand
the relative importance of a norm within a system of norms. A graded norm is interpreted in
terms of its priority, measured in terms of the value it generates in a normative multiagent
system. This value can be determined by the social goals it helps in achieving. However,
there could be other measures for determining the priority of a norm.
In order to define a norm graph, we need to first define a norm logic KN =〈LN ,AN ,N 〉. As
we have graded norms, we define KN as a graded deontic logic, namely Probability-valued
Deontic Logic [15], to represent and reason with norms. We define the norm language LN by
extending a classical propositional language L defined upon a countable set of propositional
variables and connectives ¬ and →. In particular, LN is defined as a fuzzy modal language
over Standard Deontic Logic (SDL) to reason about the probability degree of deontic propo-
sitions. In our case the probability values are replaced by grades associated with norms. The
language, axioms and deduction relation are defined similarly as in the case of the belief
logic, and again we will be interested in the sublanguage L∗N of graded formulas. For details,
we refer to [15].
Some examples of formulas in a graded normative language L∗N are given below. Also,
to keep uniformity with the belief, desire, and intention languages as described above, we
adopt a slightly different notation from that given in [15]:
(
O(uses(john,public_transport)→validates(john,ticket)),0.8)
means that, the probability is at least 0.8 that it is obligatory that, if John uses public
transport, John validates the ticket;
(
O(is_citizen_of (anna,utopia)→pays_taxes(anna,utopia)),1)
means that, the probability is (at least) 1 that, it is obligatory that, if Anna is a citizen of
Utopia, Anna pays taxes to Utopia.
5.2 Reasoning Across Contexts
Reasoning in a BDI normative agent architecture needs to consider the influence of cognitions
and norms between each other. For instance, it is desirable to choose or predict an action
that is most coherent with the set of cognitions and accepted norms. It is also desirable to
know the influence of a new information on the overall coherence of cognitions and norms.
Typically, in a multi-context system, such reasoning is achieved by the use of bridge rules.
For coherence-driven agents we adapt the idea of bridge rules to be able to establish links
and coherence values across several coherence graphs.
Bridge rules are in a certain sense inference rules carrying inferences between theories of
different logics. Since theories determine the nodes of coherence graphs, we can use these
bridge rules to find coherence values (and thus edges) between nodes of different graphs.
However, we generalise this process to include any inference rules which take premises and
conclusion from theories of different contexts. For this, we define two kinds of functions on
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tuples g¯=〈g1,...,gn〉 in Gn representing the coherence graphs determined by a collection of
theory presentations of various contexts.
First, we shall define functions that extend individual coherence graphs gi with new nodes
whenever the corresponding formulas can be derived using inferences across contexts. In
these cases there will exist a positive coherence relation between the premises and the con-
clusion of context-bridging inference rules. Consequently, we also define functions that make
the union of all coherence graphs gi and further add those edges between nodes coming
from premises and conclusions of context-bridging inference rules. Below we define both the
graph-extension and edge-join functions and, finally, we discuss the definition and applica-
tion of these functions for bridge rules.
A graph-extension function (denoted with ε) takes into account the influence of graphs
on each other. (For example, when an agent wants it to be the case that, whenever it has an
intention (Iϕ,r) in the intention graph, then a corresponding belief (Bϕ,r) is inferred into
the belief graph.)
DEFINITION 5.5
We say that a function ε :Gn→Gn , n>0, is a graph-extension function if, given a tuple of
graphs g¯=〈g1,...,gn〉 in Gn , ε(g¯)= g¯ ′ is such that
• V ′i ⊇Vi
• E ′i=Ei
• ζ′i=ζi .
Let E denote the set of all graph-extension functions (for a fixed n).
A desirable property for a function ε∈E would be to have fixed points. This is because
a fixed point gives us a terminating condition for the repeated application of an extension
function. We call a tuple of graphs g¯ a fixed point of a subset S⊆E , if the value of the
application of any extension function in S on g¯ is g¯.
DEFINITION 5.6
We say that a sequence is an extension sequence if, given a tuple of graphs g¯∈Gn , n>0, and
a set of graph-extension functions S⊆E ,
g0={g¯},...,gi={ε(h¯) | h¯∈gi−1∧ε∈S},...
and say that the elements of gj , j>0, are fixed points of S applied over g¯ (denoted as S∗(g¯))
if gj=gj−1. Further, we say that the fixed point is unique if |S∗(g¯)|=1.
A graph-join function (denoted with ι) takes n graphs and joins them together, further
adding new edges (and coherence values on the edges) between certain nodes. This does
not change the theories, as this function only makes new associations between formulas of
different theories. (For example, when an agent wants it to be the case that, whenever an
intention (Iϕ,r) in the intention graph has lead to a corresponding belief (Bϕ,r) in the belief
graph, these two formulas are to be related by positive coherence.)
DEFINITION 5.7
We say that a function ι :Gn→G, n>0, is a graph-join function if, given a tuple of graphs
g¯=〈g1,...,gn〉 in Gn , with gi=〈Vi,Ei,ζi〉, ι(g¯)=〈V ,E,ζ〉 is such that:
• V =
⋃
1≤i≤n
{i : |∈Vi}
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• E⊇
⋃
1≤i≤n
{
{i :,i :} | {,}∈Ei
}
• ζ :E→[−1,1]\{0} such that ζ({i :,i :})=ζi({,})
Let J denote the set of all graph-join functions (for a fixed n).
Now we define the composition of graphs in a tuple g¯ by combining the two kinds of
functions. That is, we apply a graph-join function ι∈J on the fixed point of a set of graph-
extension functions S⊆E applied over g¯. Note that here we assume S has a unique fixed
point applied over any tuple of graphs g¯. This is, however, a fair assumption given that we
can construct the functions in S according to the requirements. Further, it should be noted
that we keep the theories separate and only compose the corresponding coherence graphs.
DEFINITION 5.8
We say that a function ς :Gn→G, n>0, is a graph-composition function if, given a tuple
of graphs g¯ in Gn , a set of graph-extension functions S⊆E with a unique fixed point and a
graph-join function ι∈J , ς(g¯)= ι(S∗(g¯)).
5.2.1 Bridge Rules — Composition Functions
Now we describe how such graph-composition functions can be derived from bridge rules.
Bridge rules have been used in multi-context systems to make inferences across contexts.
Here we use them to derive coherence associations across graphs that correspond to theory
presentations of graded formulas.
DEFINITION 5.9
Given a family {Ci}i=1...n of contexts, n>0, a bridge rule b is a rule of the form
i1 :(A1,R1) i2 :(A2,R2) ··· iq :(Aq,Rq)
j :(A,f (R1,R2,...,Rq))
where:
• ik (with k ∈{1,...,q} and q>0) and j are all pairwise distinct5 indeces of contexts (i.e.,
1≤ ik ,j≤n)
• Ak and A are are formula schemata specifying premises from contexts Cik and a conclu-
sion from context Cj , respectively
• Rk are either variables or numerical constants in Q∩[0,1]
• f (R1,R2,...,Rq) is an expression, where f :(Q∩[0,1])q→Q∩[0,1]
Let B denote the set of all such bridge rules.
Given a bridge rule b∈B, we derive a graph-extension function that, given tuple g¯=
〈g1,...,gn〉 of graphs, extends graph gj with a new node corresponding to an instance of the
conclusion schema A.
DEFINITION 5.10
Let {Ci}i=1...n be a family of contexts, n>0, and let
b= i1 :(A1,R1) i2 :(A2,R2) ··· iq :(Aq,Rq)
j :(A,f (R1,R2,...,Rq))
5 This condition can be dispensed with; we only require it for subsequent ease of presentation of Definition 5.11
below.
[11:53 11/12/2009 jzp074.tex] Paper Size: a4 paper Job: JIGPAL Page: 23 1–39
Deductive coherence and norm adoption 23
be a a bridge rule as in Definition 5.9. The graph-extension function εb is defined as
follows: Given a tuple of graphs g¯=〈g1,...,gj ,...,gn〉 (with gj=〈Vj ,Ej ,ζj 〉), then εb(g¯)=
〈g1,...,g ′j ,...,gn〉 where g ′j=〈V ′j ,E ′j ,ζ′j 〉 such that
• V ′j =Vj∪{(π(A),f (π(R1),π(R2),...,π(Rq)))} if there exists a most general substitution
π such that, for all k ∈{1,...,q}, (π(Ak),π(Rk))∈Vk ; otherwise V ′j =Vj
• E ′j=Ej
• ζ′j({v,w})=ζj({v,w}) for all v,w∈Vj
Given a finite set of bridge rules B⊆B, we derive a graph-join function that, given tuple
g¯=〈g1,...,gn〉 of graphs, joins all graphs gi together, adding new edges and their coherence
values between nodes corresponding to instances of premise schemata Ak and the conclusion
schema A, and also between instances of premise schemata themselves, in accordance to
Thagard’s principles discussed in Section 4.1.
DEFINITION 5.11
Let {Ci}i=1...n be a family of contexts, n>0, and let B⊆B be a finite subset of bridge rules.
The graph-join function ιB is defined as follows: Given a tuple of graphs g¯=〈g1,...,gn〉 (with
gi=〈Vi,Ei,ζi〉), then ιB(g¯)=〈V ,E,ζ〉 such that
• V =
⋃
1≤i≤n
{i : |∈Vi}
• E=
⋃
1≤i≤n
{
{i :,i :} | {,}∈Ei
}
∪
⋃
b∈B
⎧⎨
⎩{i :,j :}
∣∣∣∣∣∣
i : is a premise of π(b) and j : is the conclusion of π(b),
where π is a most general substitution, such that,
for all premises k :(A,R) of b, π((A,R))∈Vk
⎫⎬
⎭∪
⋃
b∈B
⎧⎨
⎩{i :,j :}
∣∣∣∣∣∣
i : and j : are premises of π(b), i = j ,
where π is a most general substitution, such that,
for all premises k :(A,R) of b, π((A,R))∈Vk
⎫⎬
⎭
• ζ({i :,i :})=ζi({,}), and ζ({i :,j :}) for i = j is defined as in Definition 5.3 with
respect to the following support function:
η(i :,j :)=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
max
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
r
||+1 where  is the smallest subset of V , such that
∃b∈B such that ∪{i :} is the set of premises
and j : with =(α,r) is the conclusion of π(b),
where π is a most general substitution, such that,
for all premises k :(A,R) of b, π((A,R))∈Vk
r
||+2 where  is the smallest subset of V , such that
∃b∈B such that ∪{i :,j :} is the set of
premises and h :(α,r) is the conclusion of π(b),
where π is a most general substitution, such that,
for all premises k :(A,R) of b, π((A,R))∈Vk
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
undefined, otherwise
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5.2.2 Application of Composition Functions — An Example
Consider, for example, the tuple of graphs 〈gB,gD,gI 〉 corresponding to a multi-context sys-
tem with belief context CB , desire context CD and intention context CI , and with a single
bridge rule
b= B :(Bϕ,r) D :(Dϕ,s)
I :(Iϕ,min(r,s))
Let’s further assume that (Bp,0.95) is a node in gB and (Dp,0.7) is a node in gD where p is
a proposition. Then,
• εb(〈gB,gD,gI 〉)=〈gB,gD,g ′I 〉, where g ′I is gI with the node (Ip,0.7) added to its set of
nodes.
• ι{b}(〈gB,gD,g ′I 〉) is the disjoint union of graphs gB , gD, and g ′I with the additional edges {B :
(Bp,0.95),I :(Ip,0.7)}, {D :(Dp,0.7),I :(Ip,0.7)}, and {B :(Bp,0.95),D :(Dp,0.7)}, with
coherence value 0.35 for all of them.
5.3 Coherence-Driven Agents
Equipped with contexts and a mechanism to reason across these contexts, we can now turn
our attention to formally define a coherence-driven agent. Recall that, the MCS specifica-
tion of an agent is a group of interconnected contexts 〈{Ci},B〉. Each context is a tuple
Ci=〈Li,Ai,i,Ti〉 where Li , Ai and i are the language, axioms, and inference rules of a
logical system, and Ti is a finite theory presentation. In our extension of MCS, a coherence-
driven agent will further have a function cohgraph that maps a context to its corresponding
coherence graphs. And a function compfun that maps a set of bridge rules to a graph-
composition function. This extension is required because contexts are expressed as coher-
ence graphs and agents will need both coherence and graph-composition functions to reason
within and between graphs. For the normative BDI agents considered here, the contexts are
CB , CD, CI and CN , which determine a belief graph gB , a desire graph gD, an intention graph
gI , and a norm graph gN , respectively. Hence we have the following definition:
DEFINITION 5.12
A coherence-driven agent a is a tuple 〈{Ci}i=B,D,I ,N ,B,cohgraph,compfun〉 where
{Ci}i=B,D,I ,N is a family of contexts, B⊆B is a set of bridge rules, cohgraph : {Ci}i=B,D,I ,N →G
maps contexts to coherence graphs, and compfun :2B→G(G4) maps sets of bridge rules to
composition functions that take a quadruple of graphs to a graph.
In the following we describe how coherence-driven agents interact with a normative envi-
ronment. As in Figure 4, a coherence-driven agent starts with a set {Ci}i=B,D,I ,N of contexts
corresponding to the beliefs, desires, intentions and norms, which it expresses as coherence
graphs. We assume that the languages of each context are all extensions of the same proposi-
tional language L. It is also desirable for the theory presentations of contexts to be consistent.
Our proposal, however, is tolerant to inconsistencies and in a certain sense exposes them
and eliminates them, if possible. Further, the agent is assumed to have a set B of bridge
rules to reason across contexts and it computes the composite graph using these.
An agent at any time can either perceive the normative environment or make a prediction
about a future action. In the event of a new piece of information (Kϕ,r) (where K is one of
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FIG. 4. Architecture of a coherence-driven agent
the modal operator of its context languages) the agent reasoning proceeds according to the
following algorithm:
1. it adds the new graded formula to the theory T of the corresponding context CB , CD,
CI , or CN (depending if K is either B, D, I , or else O or P, respectively);
2. it computes the deductive closure of T (but, to keep the closure finite, we compute
it limited to T •, i.e., without introducing formulas with new subformulas that are not
in T );
3. it expresses the contexts with newly closed theories as coherence graphs computing the
tuple g¯=〈cohgraph(CB),cohgraph(CD),cohgraph(CI ),cohgraph(CN )〉 associated to them;
4. it computes the composite graph g=compfun(g¯)= ιB(S∗(g¯)), where S={εb |b∈B};
5. it computes all coherence-maximising partitions6 (A,V \A), where V is the set of nodes
of g, by computing argmaxA⊆V σ(g,A), and eventually chooses one of them;7
6. it updates the theory presentations of the contexts according to the newly accepted set.
As discussed in Section 4, if the new piece of information (Kϕ,r) reinforces the original
theory, it is added to the accepted set and the theory becomes more coherent. If it contradicts
6 Finding a maximising partition of an edge-weighted graph is known to be an NP-complete problem. There
exist algorithms computing an approximation to the solution to this problem, such as max-cut or neural-network
based algorithms.
7 According to the guidelines discussed in Section 3, we can decide on a favourable accepted set. However it
should also be remembered that, coherence maximisation is more about understanding which pieces of information
can be accepted together rather than providing an ultimate answer to which piece of information should be accepted.
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elements of the original theory, then either the new piece of information is rejected, or some
part of the already accepted theory is rejected, whichever makes the theory more coherent.
To make predictions, however, the agent uses only the accepted theory. This is realistic, as
it is the accepted set that the agent wants to base its decisions on.
Another important observation is regarding the values of function σ. In theory, the coher-
ence of the graph κ(g) is set as the maximum of the strength values σ(g,A); in reality, this
could be very much dependent on the agent. If the inclusion of a node only slightly reduces
the coherence of the graph, a mildly distressed agent may choose to ignore the incoherence,
or may be satisfied with modifying the degree on the node. Whereas a heavily distressed
agent may not only choose to reject the corresponding cognition or norm, but might as well
initiate a dialogue to campaign for a change.
6 Example — Water Sharing Conﬂict
We apply the formalism developed so far in a real context of political conflict. We show how a
cognitive agent endowed with a coherence management system is capable of taking decisions
by means of maximising the coherence of its beliefs, desires and intentions. The example is
motivated by the water sharing treaty signed between the southern states of India during
1892 and 1924 and the disputes thereafter [1]. The objectives of this example are twofold.
First, to demonstrate how self-interested agents evaluate norms in a BDI context. Second, to
show a process of norm adoption caused by changes in the individual coherence evaluations
as a result of new information (beliefs, desires, etc.) being acquired. The grand aim of this
case study is to set up a framework for norm adaptation (i.e., norm change) itself, which
will be part of our future work.
We describe now the reasoning performed by a coherence-driven agent in such a setting.
We simplify the case for brevity: we model the reasoning of just one of the agents (southern
Indian state s) involved in the conflict in three snapshots of time 1891, 1892, and 1991, the
first one when the first treaty is about to be signed (when the decision to adopt a norm
is to be taken), the second, when the norm is adopted and the third after a long period of
co-operation between the states, when the situation had significantly evolved and the norm
is to be broken by s.
6.1 Terminology
To represent the cognitions and norms of an agent, we shall use belief, desire, intention
and norm languages as defined in Section 5.1. Hence, (Bϕ,r) represents that the agent
believes that proposition ϕ is true with degree at least r . (Propositions (Dϕ,r), and (Iϕ,r)
are desires and intentions and are interpreted analogously.) (Oϕ,r) is the obligation of the
agent to make ϕ happen. The degree r is a measure on the relevance of the norm, such as
for instance its priority, or to what extend it needs to be fulfilled. The statements about
the world are in propositional language where each proposition is a grounded predicate with
obvious meaning as can be seen later in the snapshots.
We assume that the agent has four contexts CB , CD,CI , and CN containing the beliefs,
desires, intentions, and permissions/obligations, respectively. We will omit the reference to
the contexts in the notation as all beliefs are in CB , desires in CD, intentions in CI , and
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permissions and obligations in CN , and therefore there is no possible confusion. The two
bridge rules we use in the water-sharing example are the following:
• b1= (Bϕ,r) (Dϕ,s)(Iϕ,min(r,s)) : Whenever a proposition is believed with degree at least r and desired
with degree at least s, then a corresponding intention with a degree at least min(r,s)
is added to the theory of context CI I . We don't intend stronger than we desire or we
believe.
• b2= (Bϕ,r) (Oϕ,s)(Iϕ,min(r,s)) : If the agent beliefs that an obligation is feasible, then it intends to
make it happen.
6.2 Pre-treaty situation (1891)
The following tables and graph represent the situation before the treaty between the two
states is proposed.
In Table 1, we list the elements of the theories TB,TD and the deductive closure of context
CB for agent s before the norm was proposed. The propositions ϕi are as given in Table 2.
The coherence graph, g1 obtained from these theories is represented in Figure 5 at the end
of Step 5 of the agent reasoning process (see Section 5.3), that is, including the effects
TB {(Bϕ1,0.75),(Bϕ2,0.9),(Bϕ5,1)}
TD {(Dϕ3,0.95)}
cl(TB) TB∪{(Bϕ4,0.68),(Bϕ3,0.68)}
TABLE 1. s’s theories and the deductive closure of context B. In this case only the belief
context deduces new formulas.
ϕ1 good(rainfall)
ϕ2 adequate(waterlevel)
ϕ3 satisfied(demand)
ϕ4 ϕ1∧ϕ2
ϕ5 ϕ4→ϕ3
TABLE 2. Propositions relevant for s’s cognitions at the beginning of the reasoning.
0.34
0.34
0.34
0.34
0.25
0.25
0.34
0.34
0.34
0.25
0.34
0.34
0.34
FIG. 5. Initial coherence graph (g1) of s as in 1891 including the bridge rule deductions
(shadowed) with κ(g1)=0.32
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Theory Existing New
TN {(Oϕ6,1)}
TB {(Bϕ1,0.75),(Bϕ2,0.9),(Bϕ5,1), {(Bϕ10,0.85),
(Bϕ4,0.75),(Bϕ3,0.75)} (Bϕ9,0.9),(Bϕ7,0.7)}
TD {(Dϕ3,0.95)} {(D¬ϕ7,1)}
TI {(Iϕ3,0.75)}
TABLE 3. New elements introduced into s’s theories in 1892
ϕ6 release(300 billion ft3)
ϕ7 realised(attack)
ϕ8 ϕ1∧ϕ2∧ϕ6
ϕ9 ϕ8→¬ϕ3
ϕ10 ¬ϕ6→ϕ7
TABLE 4. Propositions relevant for s’s cognitions in 1892
of the deductions by means of bridge rules (i.e. (Iϕ3,0.68)). The coherence κ(g1) is 0.32
and the accepted set A includes all the nodes in the graph. The computation is illustrated
in one case: η((Bϕ1,0.75),(Bϕ2,0.9))=max( 0.652 )=0.38, given that (Bϕ1,0.75),(Bϕ2,0.9)
(Bϕ4,0.75∗0.9) (assuming probabilistic independence) where  is empty, and there is no
other possible deduction to obtain one of the formulas from the other.
6.2.1 Norm adoption. Evaluating the Treaty (1892).
In 1892, a new norm was proposed: the Indian state s will get obliged to release 300 billion
ft3 of water to its neighbour state annually; included in the proposal there was a threaten
of military retaliation in the case of unfulfillment of the obligation. Certainly, the release of
water might threaten the objective of satisfying the internal demand and state s was not
necessarily happy with it. The situation of the theories at the beginning of the treaty is as
expressed in Table 3. We have incorporated the deduced intention of the previous subsection
as there was no conflict with any previous intention (the intention theory was empty —Step
6 in the algorithm). Also, we have added the new formulas associated with the obligation
and its related facts.
Agent s evaluates the proposal of the new treaty by incorporating into its theories and
its respective coherence graphs the new obligation, its implications and the sanctions that
might be incurred if the proposal is not accepted. That is, the theories are updated according
to Table 3, where the relevant propositions ϕi are as in Table 4.
Agent s now computes the composite coherence graph g2 (shown in Figure 6) resulting
from the theory update and using the set of bridge rules B={b1,b2}. There are no negative
coherence values between any pair of cognitions so the whole set is accepted again. However,
this time the overall strength of the maximal partition is κ(g) is 0.225. It is clear that
coherence has decreased by incorporating the new norm which might be interpreted as an
indication that the overall situation for s was not as good as before signing the treaty.
But still the accepted set includes the acceptance of the norm. Hence, guided by coherence
maximisation, agent s signs the treaty.
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FIG. 6. Coherence graph (g2), with norm accepted κ(g1)=0.225
Theory Existing New
TN {(Oϕ6,1)}
TB {(Bϕ1,0.75),(Bϕ2,0.9),(Bϕ3,0.75), {(Bϕ12,0.9),
(B¬ϕ3,0.15),(Bϕ4,0.75),(Bϕ5,1), (B(ϕ12→ϕ11),0.8)
(Bϕ6,0.26),(Bϕ7,0.7),(Bϕ8,0.17), (B(ϕ11→¬ϕ3),0.8)}
(Bϕ9,0.9),(Bϕ10,0.85)}
TD {(Dϕ3,0.95),(D¬ϕ7,1)} {(Dϕ12,0.85)}
TI {(Iϕ3,0.68),(Iϕ6,0.26),(I¬ϕ7,0.7)}
TABLE 5. New elements introduced into s’s theories in 1991
6.3 The Incoherence Buildup (1991)
By 1991 s experiences large-scale industrialisation, urbanisation, and higher revenue growth
and as a consequence s also experiences higher water usage. Specially important for the
example is the fact that an increase in water usage means that the possibility of satisfying
the internal demand will decrease as the fact (B(ϕ11→¬ϕ3),0.8) indicates (see Table 5).
In this last time point we don’t depict the complete graph (see Figure 7) as it is a bit
large and we just show some of the relevant nodes where the incoherence has built up. The
facts involved are listed in Table 6.
The incoherence builds up as the degree of belief in ¬ϕ3 increases as a consequence of
the new added facts.8 That creates a negative coherence that forces for the fist time a
partition with maximum coherence that does not include all the nodes in the graph. Using
the criterion of selecting as the accepted set of the partition the subgraph with maximal
strength the agent chooses the set on the right as the accepted one. In particular, node
8We assume the inference rule (Bϕ,r),(B¬ϕ,s)(0¯,1−(r+s)).
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FIG. 7. Subgraph of the coherence graph (g3)
ϕ11 increase(waterusage)
ϕ12 higher(growth)
ϕ13 (Bϕ12→ϕ11,0.8)
ϕ14 (Bϕ11→¬ϕ3,0.8)
TABLE 6. Propositions relevant for s1’s cognitions in 1991
(Oϕ6,1) appears in the rejected set and therefore the Indian state s decides to break the
norm in order to keep a maximal coherence value.
6.4 Discussion
Even though the example only demonstrates the case of a single norm, the example can
be easily extended to cases where there are multiple norms and there is a need to choose
among them. In terms of coherence, this is again selecting a norm (or a set of norms) that
maximises the coherence of the graph. By inserting all the norms into the coherence graph
and then calculating the coherence maximising partition, we can see which of the norms fall
into the accepted set and hence can be adopted together. Another point to note is that here
we have assumed our agents to be coherence maximising. But in reality there may be other
criteria that need to be considered. Some of them we already mentioned are sanctions and
rewards. Another important factor by which an agent makes a decision to adopt a norm is
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observing the behaviour of other agents. We can represent this by adding nodes into the
graph that represent our beliefs on the cognitive stance of other agents.
6.5 Computational Complexity
It has been shown that it is possible to convert a coherence maximisation problem into an
equivalent max-cut problem [31]. As max-cut is an NP-complete problem it becomes clear
that coherence maximisation is also an NP-complete problem. However neural network based
algorithms give good approximations. Thagard in his formalisation of coherence gave several
implementations of coherence, with an extensive implementation of a neural network model
called ECHO [31]. He also compared it with a max-cut implementation. We have extended
Thagard’s implementation to incorporate additional features of our model. That is, our
implementation uses a Prolog-based meta interpreter to extract proofs of each sentence in
the BDI base of the agent where these proofs will give raise to the coherence values between
pairs of sentences using the support function of Definition 5.2. We further use a semi-definite
programming max-cut approximation algorithm to evaluate the coherence of the graph and
to determine the nodes in the accepted set [34]. Experimental evaluation of the case study
is part of our immediate future work.
7 State of the Art
In this paper, we proposed a coherence-based framework to design increasingly sophisticated
agents with autonomous capabilities, and illustrated that such agents would take flexible
and dynamic decisions when faced with dynamic and uncertain scenarios. We particularly
aimed at introducing autonomous agents in the context of normative multiagent systems and
demonstrated, from the point of view of an agent, that autonomy helps in evaluating norms
(rather than following designer specifications without deliberation). On the other hand, we
attempted to formalise the theory of coherence in a generic and computationally plausible
manner and, to a large extend, independent of the domain of interest. Because our work links
different areas of research, we explore in this section the work done in few of those important
related areas, namely autonomous agent deliberation, normative systems and autonomous
norm evaluation, and formalisation of coherence. Further, argumentation has been a popular
means for internal and external deliberation in agents and hence treated as an important
means to bring in autonomy in agents. Hence we make a comparison of our coherence-based
framework with argumentation frameworks and remark about a few interesting works in
the field of legal reasoning where argumentation has been the predominant mechanism for
decision making.
7.1 Autonomous Agent Deliberation
From the years that agent theory came into existence, autonomy is one of the most desired
features to be incorporated in agent design. The first major step was made when a behaviour
model of agents was proposed —the BDI model for artificial agents based on the theory of
rational action in humans put forward in 1988 by the philosopher M. Bratman [8]. The
BDI model is fundamentally reliant on folk psychology, which is the notion that our mental
models of the world are theories. BDI logics are multi-modal logics developed by Rao and
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Georgeff during the 1990s [29]. However, the BDI model of agents was an attempt to solve a
problem that has more to do with planning than with the design of autonomous agents. Yet,
the BDI model served as the base model on which others could build more sophisticated
features. From BDICTL of Rao and Georgeff’s, LORA (the logic of rational agents) [35] to
BOID [9], there have been numerous proposals to incorporate various levels of autonomy in
agent design. However, as mentioned in the introduction, other than incorporating certain
static priority-based reasoning components into agent theories, we still lack sophisticated
reasoning tools to make of agents true autonomous entities.
The work of Pasquier et al. [27] is an attempt at bringing more autonomous and dynamic
reasoning into agent theories. They propose a cognitive coherence-based model of com-
munication, argumentation, and reasoning from an agents perspective. The authors have
developed a model of cognitive coherence that could be used to extend the agents reasoning
mechanism to include social commitments. Their work is based, like ours, on the char-
acterisation of coherence as maximising constraint satisfaction proposed by Thagard [31].
Thagard in his characterisation of coherence differentiates types of coherence that need to be
accounted for in order to formalise coherence. In our proposal we develop further this idea of
Thagard and take the first step in this direction by giving a proof-theoretic characterisation
of deductive coherence. Our approach differs from Pasquier et al. because our research is
centered on developing a coherence framework that is fully computable and generic, and in
particular, on exploring methods to compute coherence values between pieces of informa-
tion.
7.2 Normative Systems and Autonomous Norm Deliberation
As described in the introduction, norms help agents to form certain behaviour expectations of
their counterparts in a multiagent system, which in turn helps the system to work efficiently.
In this sense normative systems provide a very promising model for multiagent interaction
and co-ordination [7]. One of the early introductions of norms for multiagent co-ordination is
the work on artificial social systems by Tennenholtz et al. [19, 25, 30]. The problem studied
in artificial social systems is the design, emergence or, more generally, the creation of social
laws. Shoham and Tennenholtz studied artificial social systems using notions of game theory.
Continuing their work, there has been much research in normative multiagent systems both
from the social and from the cognitive perspectives [12, 14, 36]. As our work mainly deals
with the cognitive aspect of norms, the following discussion focuses on proposals from a
cognitive perspective. We discuss two of the representative proposals below.
The work by Boella et al. [6] gives a comprehensive account of the situations faced by
different types of agents in which they could possibly violate norms. Situations include:
when there are contradictions between goals and obligations, when violation is preferred to
possible sanction, when an agent is ignorant about a norm or consequences of it, or when
it is impossible to fulfil the obligation. This work also attempts to formalise some of these
notions. What relates Boella et al.’s work and ours is that all these situations are somehow
incoherent, and a coherence-driven agent can be used to model them. However, their work
does not address the reasoning within the agent.
The work of Conte et al. treats norms from the cognitive perspective of individual agents
[13, 14]. They claim that some of the most important issues surrounding the study of norms
are how agents can acquire norms, how agents can violate norms, and how an agent can be
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autonomous. In their work they address the issue of autonomous norm acceptance in agents
and how that is instrumental to distributed norm formation and norm conformity in an
agent society. The authors describe autonomous norm acceptance as a two-step process, first
recognising the norm issued by an external entity as a norm, and once the agent has accepted
this norm, deciding to conform to it. The first step according to the authors would form the
normative belief, and the second step would create the normative goal or intention. Moving
from normative belief to normative conformity would additionally need the existence of other
private goals of the agent, which would benefit from the normative goal. The work provides
a set of rules for normative acceptance and conformity. The authors, though recognising the
importance of norm acceptance, sidestep the problem of coming up with mechanisms for
autonomous norm acceptance. That is, recognising a norm as a norm is not equivalent to
evaluating the norm. For an autonomous agent to accept a norm, the agent has to understand
what a norm really means and its implications in terms of its own cognitions. And to conform
to a norm it should know what actions or beliefs are permitted, prohibited or obliged. In this
sense our work is complementary to theirs as we propose a mechanism for norm evaluation
that can be embedded in the process of norm emergence proposed by the authors.
7.3 Formalising Coherence
Here we primarily analyse those proposals that formalise coherence. The theory of coherence
has been studied in philosophy, computer science, and law. There are very few attempts to
formalise coherence so that it could be used as a general framework. Still, there exist a few
proposals in the field of linguistic coherence. Hence, we take two representative samples and
analyse them in more detail. Both these works concentrate on linguistic coherence, which
is the property of a text or conversation being semantically meaningful. However, from the
formal perspectives, there are overlaps as the principles of coherence essentially stay the
same. We compare and contrast their proposals and our work.
The work of Piwek attempts to model dialogue coherence in terms of generative systems
based on natural deduction [28]. The main argument in his work is that it is possible to
generate coherent dialogues by relying on entailment relations in the agent’s knowledge
base. The paper primarily deals with information-seeking dialogues where the definition of
whether an agent knows a fact is equated to whether this fact can be logically entailed.
This is an interesting way to look at dialogue coherence where the concern here is semantic
rather than structural. However, the properties of cognitive coherence as a relation are
neither exploited nor modelled. Coherence in his work refers to the meaning of coherence in
a linguistic sense; i.e, what makes a text or conversation semantically meaningful, whereas
the coherence we deal with is a property of the cognitive state. Though coherence is related
to entailment, coherence is not equivalent to it, and it is important to capture and model
the differences.
The work of Valencia et al. models agent dialogues based on the theory of dissonance
[33]. The theory of cognitive dissonance states that contradicting cognitions serve as a driv-
ing force that compels the mind to acquire or invent new thoughts or beliefs, or to modify
existing beliefs, so as to reduce the amount of dissonance (conflict) between cognitions.
Their work exploits the drive to reduce dissonance as a cause to initiate a dialogue and
further, when this dissonance no longer persists, to terminate the dialogue. It is curious to
note that many authors who have used the theory of dissonance in dialogue initiation and
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termination have not considered the fact that not all incoherences are dissonances [27, 33].
Further, dissonance seeks out specialised information or actions. The most important differ-
ence between the work of Valencia et al. and ours is that for them coherence (or the lack of
it) is a local phenomena concerning only the new arriving fact and the fact that it contradicts
with, whereas for us coherence is a global phenomena affecting the entire knowledge base
of the agent. As in the case of the previous work, the authors equate coherence with logical
entailment.
7.4 Comparison with Argumentation Frameworks
Since the work of Pollock, Loui, and others, argumentation systems are a popular means
to study non-monotonic reasoning. Apart from studying non-monotonicity, argumentation
systems are also increasingly used to model deliberation, negotiation and decision making.
For example, the frameworks of Bondarenko, Dung, Toni and Kowalski are used to model
agent deliberation both from internal and from external perspectives [4, 26, 27]. Internal
deliberation helps agents to deal with internal conflicts in goals, and conflicts among goals
and norms. External deliberation assists a group of agents to reach consensus or agree on
decisions through persuasion and negotiation. Since Dung’s framework is the most abstract
framework studied and widely used in particular argumentation systems, we highlight its
main characteristics and contrast it with our work.
An argument system is characterised by pairwise attack relations between arguments. The
concept of acceptability and admissibility of arguments are central notions in the theory.
Acceptability of an argument with respect to a set is a measure of its justification within
the set, however, note that it is a Boolean measure. Admissible sets are those that have all
elements as accepted with respect to that set. Further, the notion of a preferred extension
finds the maximal over the admissible sets. Stable extensions are preferred extensions with
yet another constraint, namely that every argument outside of it is defeated. These notions,
in a broad sense, capture the idea of a maximal, conflict-free, and justified set of arguments.
In coherence terms, a preferred or stable extension can be compared to accepted sets of a
coherence graph.
However, there are a few important differences that distinguish a preferred set of argu-
ments from that of an accepted set of a coherence graph. First of all, a preferred extension
attempts to find those sets of arguments that are indisputable. They do not tolerate incon-
sistencies or contradictions. An argument based system tends to be more brittle in that
it cannot easily cope with varying degrees of acceptability. Usually it is an all or nothing
affair: given a set of arguments, an argument is either acceptable or not; there is nothing in
between. Whereas in reality, an argumentation system may need to find the least inconsis-
tent set of arguments than to find the absolute set that is justified. Coherence maximisation
finds such a set with tolerance to inconsistencies.
Another difference is that often arguments contradict one another not in absolute values.
One can associate a degree of contradiction, or a degree of support between arguments. It is
important to account for this degree as they have an impact on deciding the final outcome.
Since coherence captures this degree of relatedness between elements, coherence may give
us a more realistic measure.
However, argument-based approaches yield explicit reasons why an outcome should be
adopted and explicit refutations of alternatives. Coherence-based approaches are criticised
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for their lack of transparency. However, in our approach, since we derive our coherence mea-
sures from the deduction relation of an underlying logic, we make explicit the process, why
two pieces of information are related (or why two arguments are on an attack relation). Fur-
ther, since coherence maximisation is interpreted as maximising satisfaction of constraints,
we pick a set as an accepted set when it satisfies maximum constraints, or when we have a
maximal set of arguments that are in some sense justified and coherent. This process has
the added advantage that it not only looks for justified arguments but coherent arguments.
In [3], Amaya tries to apply a notion of coherence in legal justification and studies how
notions of fairness and coherence are related. The work also claims that coherence consid-
erations need to be taken into account while putting forward an argument along with truth
and fairness considerations. In her work, Amaya analyses Thagard’s model of coherence
as constraint satisfaction and argues that such a model should be used in conducting argu-
ment justification in legal reasoning. She has analysed different aspects of coherence and has
studied formalised systems of coherence thoroughly. Her treatment clarifies many concep-
tual issues about coherence. However, apart from suggesting and justifying why coherence
needs to be used in legal reasoning, she does not propose a formalisation. Another work on
argumentation applies a coherence-based mechanism for practical reasoning systems [16].
From the above discussion on the related work, it is clear that there is both a need for
psychologically inspired models such as cognitive theory of coherence and an interest in
developing such systems from diverse areas. The need is however for formalisation of the
abstract theories and for developing computationally feasible models.
8 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we have proposed a coherence-based framework which extends the popular
BDI architecture by including the notion of coherence. The first research objective we set
out to achieve in this paper was (see Section 1):
‘‘to find mechanisms for reasoning in norm-autonomous agents that enable them to
resolve conflicts among cognitions and norms.’’
We proposed coherence maximisation as a reasoning mechanism for adopting or violating
norms. To build coherence maximising agents, we proposed a coherence framework that
incorporates the representation, and coherence maximising functions to enable actual com-
putation. We also defined computable functions to generate coherence constraints in the
coherence graph of an agent. We further provided an algorithm that lets an agent take deci-
sions regarding norm adoption. We illustrated this with the help of an example drawn from
a real world scenario.
The second research objective we set out to achieve in this paper was (see Section 1):
‘‘to determine if and how such a reasoning tool can be incorporated in an agent theory
such as BDI theory.’’
We defined an agent architecture that extends a BDI-based one by introducing coherence
maximisation as the principle reasoning mechanism. In particular, we extended a multi-
context BDI architecture to incorporate the fact that theories in each context are expressed
as coherence graphs. We also proposed an algorithm to implement coherence-driven agents
that accept or rejects a new piece of information driven by coherence maximisation. There
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are, however, many associations and details to be explored further. We mention some of
them in the discussion below.
In the paper we mention that we see the process of coherence maximisation as the process
of theory revision. The intuition is that, if a belief in the accepted set moves to the rejected
set, the confidence on the belief no longer remains the same and should be reduced. The
contrary is true if a rejected belief is accepted again. Thus, the degrees on the cognitions or
norms can be computed using a probabilistic distribution driven by coherence maximisation.
However, this topic needs to be further explored and its connection with other popular
theories such as AGM [2] needs to be studied.
The choice of deductive coherence is another point of discussion. We admit that for agent
reasoning and decision making, probably an analysis of deliberative or explanatory coher-
ence would be much more appropriate. We picked deductive coherence so that we could
readily show the significance of incorporating coherence in an agent theory. In this case, the
underlying deduction relation is well understood. However, we could apply our results to
different types of coherence.
There are also criticisms raised about the philosophy of coherence. One question often put
forward with respect to the application of coherence as an agent decision-making mechanism
is: whether it is rational for an agent to behave according to coherence maximisation. Nor-
mally an agent reasoning about norms takes into account influences of utility maximisation,
models of other agents, and sanctions or rewards. We claim that we can introduce these
decision making factors into our coherence graph so that the coherence maximisation is the
only evaluation necessary for the decision making process. One of our main future work is
to place coherence among other theories of rationality and justify the above claims with
concrete results.
Another important question is about the computational feasibility of coherence maximi-
sation. Unlike other proposals on coherence maximisation, in this paper, we have introduced
a fully computational framework of coherence, although coherence maximisation is an NP-
complete problem. However, as we assume bounded rationality for our agents, our coherence
graphs are bounded and are not complete. To further reduce the computational burden, our
future work aims to bring in contexts that would consider only sub-graphs of the actual
ones, with the intuition that coherence maximisation should consider only those nodes that
are relevant to the problem at hand.
An important issue we have not explored in depth is the treatment of norms. We would
like to study the structure of norms in more detail, and possibly express them as coherence
constraints on the cognitions. This would enable agents in a normative system to generate
new norms, and further help agents to evaluate existing norms in the context of its cognitions.
Finally, in the present work we have dealt with the cognitive aspect of a normative multia-
gent system. In the future we would like to explore norm evolution in a society of coherence-
driven agents. In particular, we plan to study how agents can agree upon a set of norms,
and adapt them when required, and explore equilibrium conditions for coherence.
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